Amicus Brief in \u3cem\u3eHedberg and Hedberg, M.D. v. Wakamatsu, M.D.\u3c/em\u3e by Brodin, Mark S. & Merrill, Nickolas
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
1-1-2018
Amicus Brief in Hedberg and Hedberg , M.D. v.
Wakamatsu, M.D.
Mark S. Brodin
Boston College Law School, brodin@bc.edu
Nickolas Merrill
Boston College Law School, nickolas.merrill@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Evidence Commons, and the State and Local
Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mark S. Brodin and Nickolas Merrill. "Amicus Brief in Hedberg and Hedberg , M.D. v. Wakamatsu, M.D.." (2018).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS 
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT 
NO. 12624 
____________________ 
LESLIE HEDBERG AND PETER HEDBERG, M.D.,  
Appellants 
v.  
MAY WAKAMATSU, M.D.,  
Appellee 
 
ON APPEAL FROM A FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE 
SUFFOLK COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT 
 
BRIEF FOR AMICUS CURIAE 
PROFESSOR MARK S. BRODIN, ESQ. 
NICKOLAS I. MERRILL 
____________________ 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
 
Thomas J. Carey, Jr. 
(BBO No. 073680) 
1131 Main Street 
Hingham, MA 02043 
(781) 740-1234 
careyt@bc.edu 
Attorney for Amici 
 
i.  
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ISSUE PRESENTED 
The Court's request for Amicus Briefs embraced 
multiple issues. Amici address only so much of the 
request as asks whether under Massachusetts law, in a 
civil case, a witness who testifies to a lack of 
memory of the subject matter is "unavailable" for 
purposes of the hearsay rule, thus opening the door to 
admission in evidence of prior statements against 
pecuniary interest by the witness. Amici do not 
address whether the statements would have been 
admissible or excludable under any other evidentiary 
rules or Agency principles.  
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts are more fully discussed in the briefs 
of the parties. We briefly summarize here the 
essential facts bearing on the evidentiary issues of 
witness unavailability due to loss of memory and the 
admissibility of the witness's statements against 
pecuniary interest, raised at R.A. II 110–111. 
 This is a personal injury, medical malpractice 
suit by a patient and her husband (the Hedbergs) 
against the doctor (Wakamatsu) who performed surgery 
on the patient. Record Appendix ("R.A.") I at 11–14. 
On appeal from a jury verdict for the doctor, the 
 
2 
 
patient seeks reversal and remand for new trial on the 
grounds that the trial judge erred in excluding 
critical evidence at trial bearing on the negligence 
of the doctor. R.A. II at 264; Brief of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 47. This Court took the case from the 
Appeals Court and requested amicus briefs. 
The surgical procedure required that the 
patient's legs be positioned in a certain way on 
stirrups; allegedly, permanent sciatic nerve damage 
suffered by the patient was caused by the doctor's 
negligence in positioning her legs or negligence in 
failing to make sure that no member of the surgical 
team leaned against her leg during the surgery. Id. at 
13. The team included a resident who stood next to the 
patient's right leg and a medical student who stood 
next to the patient's left leg. Id. at 70; R.A. II at 
15.  
A day after surgery, the medical student (Dr. 
Stephen) spoke with the patient (Mrs. Hedberg) in the 
hospital; he made notes in her chart documenting 
severe pain from sciatic nerve injury and mentioning 
the positioning of the leg. R.A. I at 209, 216. 
According to Mrs. Hedberg, he also stated that they 
had difficulty positioning her leg and he may have 
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leaned against her leg during the surgery. R.A. II at 
44–46.  
In a pre-trial deposition and in trial testimony 
by video deposition, Dr. Stephen did not deny making 
the statement; rather he simply testified he did not 
recall making the statement. R.A I at 30–31, 34; R.A. 
II at 44–46. Additionally, Dr. Stephen testified that 
he did not recall any event or conversation involving 
Mrs. Hedberg. R.A. I at 23-34. Dr. Stephen did not 
even remember Mrs. Hedberg. Id. at 24. Dr. Stephen did 
not remember anything from Mrs. Hedberg's surgery. Id. 
at 25. Dr. Stephen did not remember the positioning of 
Mrs. Hedberg's legs during the surgery. Id. Dr. 
Stephen did not remember where he was standing during 
the surgery or whether he was holding retractors 
during the surgery. Id. at 26. Furthermore, refreshing 
Dr. Stephen's memory with Dr. Wakamatsu's testimony 
[essentially that the team did nothing wrong] was 
unsuccessful, and Dr. Stephen still did not remember 
the surgery. Id. Dr. Stephen did not remember treating 
Mrs. Hedberg after the surgery on May 17 or 18. Id. at 
28. Dr. Stephen did not remember discussing Mrs. 
Hedberg's pain or surgery positioning or writing his 
observations in Mrs. Hedberg's medical record. Id. at 
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30. Dr. Stephen did not remember apologizing to Mrs. 
Hedberg and informing her that he may have been 
leaning against her leg while holding retractors. Id. 
at 30–31.  
The trial judge excluded the prior statements. 
She found that Dr. Stephen's lack of memory of the 
events in question was genuine. R.A. II at 153. She 
also questioned whether Mrs. Hedberg's recollection of 
his statements was reliable. R.A. II at 154–155. The 
ruling is at R.A. II 151-155.1   
  
                                                 
1 The judge’s finding of genuine memory loss was 
apparently made based on criminal cases that permit 
the admission of prior inconsistent statements when a 
claim of memory loss is feigned. Id. at 152–153. Amici 
do not address whether the evidence supports her 
finding because, as we argue infra, in civil cases a 
witness who testifies to a loss of memory is 
unavailable for purposes of the exception for 
statements against pecuniary interest, irrespective of 
whether the memory loss is genuine or feigned.   
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COURT SHOULD HOLD THAT UNDER THE COMMON LAW OF 
MASSACHUSETTS A WITNESS WHO TESTIFIES IN A CIVIL CASE 
TO LOSS OF MEMORY OF THE EVENTS ON TRIAL IS 
UNAVAILABLE FOR PURPOSES OF THE HEARSAY RULE.  
 
Introduction 
The Court should hold that the witness was 
unavailable by virtue of his loss of memory, a legal 
conclusion supported by the weight of opinion of 
evidence scholars and the common law decisions of 
innumerable courts. This rule was also recommended by 
the distinguished advisory committee that drafted the 
Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence. Addendum A. 
The rule was adopted in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
by the Supreme Court and Congress (Addendum B) and by 
the multitude of state legislatures and courts that 
follow the federal rules. As all of these authorities 
recognize, sound policy considerations support holding 
that a witness who testifies to loss of memory of the 
subject matter is unavailable for purposes of the 
hearsay rule. It is time for the Supreme Judicial 
Court to incorporate this principle into the common 
law of evidence in Massachusetts. 
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A. Under The Prevailing Modern View of Evidence 
Scholars and Common Law Courts, A Witness Who 
Testifies to A Loss of Memory of the Subject Matter of 
Prior Statements Is “Unavailable” for Purposes of the 
Hearsay Rule. 
 
During the Twentieth Century, the Hearsay Rule 
underwent substantial change as additional exceptions 
were recognized and existing exceptions were 
broadened. Change was particularly evident in the area 
of exceptions permitting the introduction of out of 
court statements when a witness is unavailable. 2  
Originally, declarant unavailability was "strictly 
construed" to encompass only dead declarants. 
Commonwealth v. Tobin, 160 Mass. 156 (1893); Paul J. 
Liacos, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence 324 (5th 
ed. 1981); 2 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 322–
323. The common law evolved to construe declarant 
unavailability more broadly, resulting in wider 
admissibility of probative hearsay. Liacos, Handbook 
of Massachusetts Evidence 324; see Commonwealth v. 
DiPietro, 373 Mass. 369 (1977) (satisfying declarant 
                                                 
2 Massachusetts was a pioneer in this movement and was 
hailed by evidence scholars for its statute (drafted 
by James Bradley Thayer) on declarations of deceased 
persons, and cases interpreting it. See McCormick's 
Handbook of the Law of Evidence §340 at 630–631 
(1954); 2 Edmund Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 
322–324 (1954). 
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unavailability through spousal privilege). The focus 
of the analysis changed from the unavailability of the 
declarant to the unavailability of the declarant's 
testimony.  
Valuable evidence is lost when witnesses are 
unavailable, and the recurring situation of forgetful 
witnesses is a prominent example of the problem. See 
Mark S. Brodin & Michael Avery, Handbook of 
Massachusetts Evidence §8.17 at 676 (2019). A witness 
who professes lack of memory concerning the subject 
matter of the statement has rendered his live 
testimony in that regard unavailable. See id. at 677; 
Weinstein's Evidence Manual §17.01[2] (8th ed.). The 
expansion of what constitutes witness unavailability 
was driven by the practical desire to admit probative 
evidence that would otherwise be lost or kept secret 
under the traditional unavailability standard. See 
Liacos, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence 324; 2 
Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 322–323.  
As the mid-to-late twentieth century push for 
codification of the law of Evidence gained traction, 
therefore, the virtually unanimous view of evidence 
scholars (as well as more recent common law decisions) 
defined unavailability for purposes of the hearsay 
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rule to include a declarant who testifies to a lack of 
memory of the subject matter of his statement. See 
McCormick's Handbook of the Law of Evidence §253 at 
755 (Edward W. Cleary 3rd ed. 1984); Liacos, Handbook 
of Massachusetts Evidence 324; McCormick's Handbook of 
the Law of Evidence §280 at 678–679 (Edward W. Cleary 
2d. ed. 1972); 2 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence 
325. Not surprisingly, that view strongly influenced 
codification proposals. See, e.g., Model Code of 
Evidence R. 503 (1942); Uniform Rules of Evidence R. 
804 (1974). 
B.  The Proposed Massachusetts Rules of Evidence and 
the Federal Rules of Evidence Define Unavailability to 
Include A Declarant Who Testifies to A Lack of Memory 
of The Subject Matter of His Statements. 
 
Among those who endorsed the view that loss of 
memory renders a witness unavailable for purposes of 
the hearsay rule were the distinguished Advisory 
Committee and members of the Massachusetts Bar who 
drafted and endorsed the Proposed Massachusetts Rules 
of Evidence submitted to this Court in 1980. Those 
rules would have expanded "unavailability" to include 
a declarant who "testifies to a lack of memory of the 
subject matter of his statement." Proposed Mass. R. 
Evid. 804(a)(3) (Addendum A). See 20 Hon. William G. 
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Young et al., Massachusetts Practice Evidence Series 
App. D at Advisory Committee's Note § 804(a) (3d. ed. 
2018); Brodin & Avery, Handbook of Massachusetts 
Evidence §8.17 at 676; Liacos, Handbook of 
Massachusetts Evidence 324–325.  
 At that time, the Supreme Judicial Court declined 
to adopt the Proposed Rules in toto, fearing that to 
do so would "restrict the development of common law 
principles pertaining to the admissibility of 
evidence." See Announcement Concerning the Proposed 
Massachusetts Rules of Evidence (Dec. 30, 1982) 
(reprinted in 20 Young, Massachusetts Practice 
Evidence Series App. D at Order).  
But the Court recognized the "substantial value" 
of the proposed rules and invited parties to cite them 
in briefs when advocating for changes in existing 
Massachusetts evidence law. See id. Since then, the 
Court has incorporated a number of those provisions 
into the common law of Massachusetts. See Brodin & 
Avery, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence §1.1 at 2; 
Jeremiah F. Healy III, Ten Years After: A 
Reconsideration of the Codification of Evidence Law in 
Massachusetts, 15 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 1 (1993) 
(documenting early adoptions).  
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The case at bar presents an apt vehicle for the 
Court to adopt the substance of Proposed Mass. R. 
Evid. 804(a)(3) (and the corresponding definition of 
unavailability in Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(3)) as the 
common law of Massachusetts. They define 
unavailability to include a declarant who "testifies 
to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his 
statement." Brodin & Avery, Handbook of Massachusetts 
Evidence §8.17 at 676; 20 Young, Massachusetts 
Practice Evidence Series App. D at § 804(a)(3). Each 
is designed to deal with the "recurrent evidentiary 
problem . . . [of] witness forgetfulness of an 
underlying event." Owens, 484 U.S. at 562; see 
Advisory Committee's Notes to Proposed Rules, 56 
F.R.D. 320, 322 (1972); Jack B. Weinstein, Weinstein's 
Federal Evidence: Commentary on Rules of Evidence for 
the United States Courts and Magistrates §804.02 at 
804-6–804-7 (J.M. McLaughlin ed., 2d. ed. 1997).  
A majority of states have adopted Fed. R. Evid. 
804(a)(3) verbatim or with slight textual variations. 
See 5 Jones on Evidence § 36.4 (Clifford S. Fishman & 
Anne T. McKenna eds., 7th ed. 2017). The rule requires 
a judge to determine that a declarant has "no memory 
of the events to which his hearsay statements relate" 
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from the declarant's own testimony. N. Miss. Commc'ns, 
Inc. v. Jones, 792 F.2d 1330, 1337 (5th Cir. 1986); 
see Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, Inc., 711 
F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2013); Schindler v. Seiler, 474 
F.3d 1008 (7th Cir. 2007); Bail Bonds by Marvin 
Nelson, Inc. v. Comm'r of the IRS, 820 F.2d 1543 (9th 
Cir. 1987); United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224 
(4th Cir. 1982). The decades-long use of Fed. R. Evid. 
804(a)(3) across dozens of jurisdictions provides a 
track record of the value and workability of the rule.  
By statute in Massachusetts, a claimed lack of 
memory is already a recognized basis for 
unavailability of child abuse victims in certain civil 
actions. G.L. c. 233, §82(b)(3); see Adoption of 
Quentin, 424 Mass. 882 (1997); see generally Brodin & 
Avery, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence §8.24.1 at 
696–700. 
C.  A Witness Who Testifies to Loss of Memory, Genuine 
or Feigned, is Unavailable for Purposes of the Hearsay 
Rule.  
 
The Superior Court found the witness's lack of 
memory to be genuine, not feigned, and declined to 
admit his prior statements against pecuniary interest, 
citing criminal cases involving the hearsay exception 
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for prior inconsistent statements. R.A. II at 152–153. 
This was error. It is the position of the amici that 
the distinction between feigned and sincere lack of 
memory has no place in civil cases.3  
It is true that the Court has held that prior 
witness testimony under oath before the grand jury or 
other formal proceeding is admissible for all 
probative purposes when the witness later feigns a 
lack of memory regarding the subject matter of the 
testimony at trial. Commonwealth v. DePina, 476 Mass. 
614, 620–621 (2017); Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 
55, 71 (1984); Commonwealth v. Sineiro, 432 Mass. 735, 
740 (2000); Commonwealth v. Newman, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 
495 (2007). The Court noted that "a fact finder should 
be permitted to prefer a [prior inconsistent] 
statement made closer in time to the events at issue 
over contradictory trial testimony that the passage of 
time and intervening influences may have affected." 
                                                 
3 Amici do not address the matter of criminal cases, 
where Confrontation Clause rights are implicated. 
Massachusetts common law will guide courts when 
Confrontation issues arise under the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights. See Commonwealth v. Caruso, 476 
Mass. 275, 295 n.15 (2017); Opinion of the Justices to 
the Senate, 406 Mass. 1201, 1211 (1989); see generally 
Brodin & Avery, Handbook of Massachusetts Evidence 
§8.24.2 at 596–606. 
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Daye, 393 Mass. at 71. Such a rule had already been 
adopted in almost half of the states and had fared 
well in practice.  at 69–71. 
The trial judges in those criminal cases had made 
findings that the memory loss was feigned. Feigning 
had been seen in the cases as a prerequisite to 
finding the prior statement to be inconsistent. 
DePina, 476 Mass. at 620–621; Sineiro, 432 Mass. at 
739–740. And confrontation clause concerns rather than 
hearsay principles seem to have influenced those 
criminal cases.4 
But it is the loss of probative evidence that 
drives Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 804(a)(3) and its 
federal counterpart, and that loss of evidence is just 
as problematic in a case of genuine memory loss as it 
is in a case of feigned loss. Neither Proposed Mass. 
R. Evid. 804(a)(3) nor Fed. R. Evid. 804(a)(3) draws 
                                                 
4 Massachusetts common law will guide lower courts when 
Confrontation issues arise under the Massachusetts 
Declaration of Rights. See Caruso, 476 Mass. at 295 
n.15; Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 406 Mass. 
at 1211; see generally Brodin & Avery, Handbook of 
Massachusetts Evidence §8.24.2 at 596–606. Fed. R. 
Evid. 804(a)(3) satisfies the federal Confrontation 
requirement because of the witness' subjection to 
cross-examination. Owens, 484 U.S. at 563–564.  
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such a distinction in determining unavailability,5 nor 
should the consequences of unavailability depend on 
the trial judge's ability to look into the mind of a 
witness to discern the cause of memory failure. 
Accordingly, the Court should hold that under 
Massachusetts law, in civil cases, a witness who 
testifies to loss of memory, whether genuine or 
feigned, is unavailable for purposes of the hearsay 
rule.  
Conclusion 
The medical student in the case at bar claimed a 
total lack of memory about the patient, the surgery, 
and post-operative care, as well as about his making 
any prior statement. R.A. I at 24–32. Sound policy and 
the overwhelming weight of authority compel the 
conclusion that he was "unavailable" for purposes of 
the hearsay rule under Massachusetts law, and this 
Court should so declare. 
  
                                                 
5 Nor did the U.S. Supreme Court base its decision 
admitting the prior statement of the witness in Owens 
on any finding the memory loss was feigned. Indeed, 
the facts clearly suggest it was genuine. United 
States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 556 (1988).  
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II. DR. STEPHEN'S PREVIOUS STATEMENTS WERE 
AGAINST HIS PECUNIARY INTERESTS AND SHOULD HAVE 
BEEN ADMITTED.  
 
A. Dr. Stephen’s Statements were Against His 
Pecuniary Interest. 
 
Dr. Stephen's prior statements to Mrs. Hedberg 
should have been admitted as statements against 
pecuniary interest because they clearly had the 
tendency to expose him to civil liability. See 
Commonwealth v. Carr, 373 Mass. 617, 622–624 (1977); 
N. Miss. Commc'ns, Inc., 792 F.2d at 1336–1337.  
Before making his statement, Dr. Stephen was 
aware that Mrs. Hedberg's injuries were consistent 
with improper positioning during surgery and/or 
someone leaning against her leg during the procedure. 
R.A. I at 209. Dr. Stephen was also aware of the 
critical importance of proper positioning from Dr. 
Wakamatsu's instructions prior to surgery. R.A. II at 
23–25. His statements to Mrs. Hedberg were an attempt 
to explain a potential cause of her pain. R.A. II at 
44–46. This statement had a tendency to expose Dr. 
Stephen to civil liability because it inherently 
identifies his actions as the cause of Mrs. Hedberg's 
injuries, and was therefore admissible. See 
Commonwealth v. Charles, 428 Mass. 672, 679 (1999); 
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Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(3). A reasonable person in 
that situation would not have made the statement 
unless believing it to be true. 
 
B. The Judge Erred by Intruding on the Jury’s Role in 
Assessing the Credibility of Testimony. 
 
In excluding the evidence, the trial judge stated 
her belief that there were "no indicia of reliability" 
to Mrs. Hedberg's testimony about the statement (R.A. 
II at 154–155). The indicia of reliability of 
statements against pecuniary interest inheres in the 
premise that declarants do not usually make such 
admissions unless they are true.6  
In finding that Mrs. Hedberg's testimony 
concerning the statements was not reliable, the trial 
judge erred. The credibility of Mrs. Hedberg's 
testimony as to Dr. Stephen's prior statements is not 
                                                 
6 Contrast statements against penal interest, 
which require "corroborating circumstances clearly 
indicat[ing] the trustworthiness of the statement." 
Mass. G. Evid. § 804(b)(3); see Carr, 373 Mass. at 
622–624 (additional indicia of reliability safeguard 
only applicable to statements against penal interest 
since the dangers posed by those statements are far 
greater than the dangers posed by statements against 
pecuniary interest).  
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a predicate to admissibility and was not a decision 
for the judge to make. See Commonwealth v. Drew, 397 
Mass. 65 at 76 (1986) ("The jury, rather than the 
judge, should evaluate the credibility of the 
witness."); Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 428 
Mass. 1, 13 (1998); Mass. G. Evid. § 104(e).  
It is axiomatic that the trial judge's obligation 
to rule on admissibility is "not a license for the 
trial judge to usurp the jury's function. If proffered 
evidence rests on a proper foundation, trial judges do 
not have the authority to exclude evidence because 
they do not believe it." Weinstein's Federal Evidence 
§ 104.02[2]. 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, the Court should hold 
that the statements of Dr. Stephen were admissible as 
statements against pecuniary interest of an 
unavailable declarant.  
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